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1 Introduction
In Egypt, civil society organisations (CSOs) are
for the most part engaged in charity relief and
the extension of basic goods and services. Their
role in contesting public policy or transforming
societies to make them more politically aware of
their rights has been very limited. However, in
view of the severe restrictions on political activity
imposed by the government (see Abd el Wahab,
El Naggar, this IDS Bulletin), many political
activists had turned to the formation of CSOs as
the vehicle for political engagement. The leftists
for example, became active in the establishment
of human rights organisations and the Islamists
became particularly active in religious-based
organisations.
Within the Islamist movement, the two most
prominent groups to have established
organisations (formal and informal) for the
extension of welfare services were the Muslim
Brotherhood and the Salafis (ultraconservative
Islamist groups).The Muslim Brotherhood work
through locally based organisations, syndicates
and student unions. The Salafis control large
central organisations such as Ansar al Sunna al
Muhamidiyya and El Gam’iyya el Shar’iyya. In
this article, a distinction is made between
organisations which deploy welfare services to
advance their own political agenda and are
labelled ‘Islamist’, and Islamic organisations
which have a religious mantra but do not report
to the political Islamist movement. While both
have coexisted in the Egyptian context for a long
time, this article begins by examining the role of
Islamist welfare organisations which have
conventionally had a dominance in the religious
welfare sector and then discusses their increasing
displacement by a new generation of religious-
inspired welfare providers that do not have a
direct link to the Islamist political forces.
Understanding these fundamental changes to the
political landscape of service provisions helps
challenge some of the assumptions about the
nature of the populist base of the welfare arm of
the Islamists.
2 The rise and rise of Islamist outreach
organisations
It is difficult to determine the scale of Islamic
and Islamist organisations in Egypt because of
the obvious security restrictions on the
association between welfare provision and
political activity. One cannot determine the
number of religious non-governmental
organisations (NGOs) subject directly to the
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influence of political Islamic groups. According
to Fahmy Howeidy (an intellectual with Islamist
leaning), the number of Islamic charity
associations in 1997 was 35 per cent of the total
number of NGOs, although it is unclear how he
arrived at such an estimate (Al Ahram, 14 January
1997).
One way to uncover the link between Islamist
engagement and welfare is to look at the dual
agency of Islamist figures, who are
simultaneously known to be part of an Islamist
group as well as being represented on the boards
of these NGOs. Another way is through the
security crackdowns on particular NGOs for
their Islamist orientation and which are
regularly taken up by the press.
The philosophy behind welfare provision is one of
support in return for loyalty, which is part and
parcel of the broader Islamisation of society.
Overall, Islamist organisations are run in a top-
down manner and their organisational leadership,
membership and constituency reflect the political
vision of the movements they belong to. Activities
are run on the basis of providing support in
return for loyalty. These activities may take the
form of adopting Islamic behaviours that the
Islamic movement seeks to spread (e.g. the
Salafis impose the donning of the veil, growing
the beard, praying regularly in the mosque) or
take the form of collecting and distributing zakat
(Islamic equivalent of tithing/alms) and charity
and securing beneficiaries’ votes in local and
parliamentary elections. The latter occurs
without any effort to raise the political conscience
of the poor, but engages with them as repertoires
of election votes.
The NGOs that are directly or indirectly subject
to Islamist forces have been captured by the
traditional local Islamist elites. The level of
loyalty to these elites is often linked to the size
and consistency of welfare support. The role of
NGOs in building the influence of traditional
groups, especially those who belong to the
Muslim Brotherhood, could be observed through
the link between their most prominent
parliamentary candidates and NGOs.
The ability of the organisations to build a strong
welfare foundation coincided with the state’s
demand for other actors to step in and provide
socioeconomic services that the state was failing
to provide; particularly under structural
adjustment policies. The supply of substantial
resources from the Gulf for the strengthening of
Islamist activities made it possible for the
Islamist welfare organisations to take on some of
the welfare responsibilities. Funding came from
formal and informal sources in the Gulf –
governmental, individual and associational. The
latter includes the International Islamic Charity
Organization, the Al Najaa Charity Association,
Kuwaiti Beit al Zakat and others. Donations
from the association of Kuwaiti Revival of
Islamic Heritage can be used as an example: it is
a Salafi association that channelled, in one
instance in the 1990s, EGP500 million to a
number of Islamic religious associations that
were directly linked to the Islamism movement.
This sum helped in building 12 Islamic centres,
three health units, 42 Islamic libraries and a
number of investment projects and mosques –
and this is just one model (Shobieb 1994).
Moreover, prominence was given to zakat and its
collection and distribution for charitable welfare
purposes.1 Through the expansion of the Islamist
welfare network, the state was able to mitigate
the social tensions emanating from the negative
socioeconomic impacts of structural adjustment.
In turn, the Islamists were able to build an
intellectual and public base within communities
on a significant scale.
An analysis of the activities of 27 associations in
2004 (based in Cairo, Damietta from the Delta
and Minya from Upper Egypt) showed that by
far, the most frequent activity was the
distribution of charitable handouts: financial or
in-kind. This is followed by day-care centres and
Koran recitation classes and training in sewing,
welding or some other livelihood skill. Down the
ladder was ‘organising religious competitions and
celebrations and the organisation of haj trips’.
While there was variation in some of the activities,
overall there was usually a set ‘menu’ of activities
that were offered across the different communities,
irrespective of their local specificities.
With respect to welfare provision, many of the
interventions offered in the 1980s and 1990s were
in the health and education sectors. In education,
the most common activity was the provision of
classes for students enrolled in public schools at
primary and secondary levels. These lessons were
provided by the Islamist movement’s youth, both
university students and graduates. The enrolled
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students provided a core recruitment base for
preparing girls and boys to become activists later
at university stage. The extension of such
educational services represented one of the most
popular activities pursued by the Islamist NGOs
by virtue of their indoctrination and constituency-
building potential. Further, in view of the rapid
deterioration of the quality of public education,
many middle-class families (which represent the
social base of the Muslim Brotherhood) chose to
enrol their children in private schools (different
types and levels). For example, in a field study in
2005, conducted on a sample of Alexandria
university students, it was found that 50.6 per
cent of the sample received their pre-university
education in private schools. This result
encouraged the Islamists (especially the
Brotherhood) to expand educational investment
to establish Islamic schools (Arabic/Language) in
all spheres; whether owned by individuals linked
to Islamist organisations or owned by Islamist
NGOs. Examples are: schools of the Muslims
Generation affiliated to the Al Tarbawia Al
Islamyaa Association in Gharbia; schools and
preschool day-care centres affiliated to Al Da’wa
Al Islamiyya Association in Bani Suef; and schools
and kindergartens affiliated to Gama’a Da’wat
Al Haq Association. These schools were built to
respond to the demand for good quality education
by the upper tiers and restricted enrolment to
Muslim students only. Most of the staff members
of Islamic schools were Islamism activists who
adopted a religious pedagogical approach to the
education process, for example integrating Koran
memorisation classes in their curriculum.
The main intervention pursued by Islamist
organisations in the area of health was the
establishment of outpatient health clinics, which
offered clients treatment by a team of doctors
from a diverse number of specialisations. Clients
paid a nominal fee that was sufficient to cover the
cost of running the dispensary. Many of these
outpatient clinics were established locally by
large organisations such as the Al Shar’iyya
Association which had the resources to support
such initiatives. In addition to dispensaries, many
small Islamist NGOs were able to capitalise on
their pool of doctors to send them on medical
convoys to the villages. These convoys were
popular and attracted much media attention.
The cost of these convoys was low compared with
establishing big specialised medical centres.
Medical convoys were regularly organised by
Muslim Brotherhood activists to Misr Qadima in
Cairo,2 Alexandria,3 Assuit4 and Ismailia.5
3 The demise of the parallel Islamist welfare
system
By the beginning of the 2000s, the Islamists could
no longer maintain their same distinctive mark in
the community through welfare provision.
Endemic diseases among Egyptians were
widespread and the state’s role in providing free
basic health provision had shrunk even further
than the earlier decades. The Islamists simply
could not fill an ever-growing gap in health
needs, in particular since what was required were
costly services that could not be provided through
small outpatient clinics. Islamist NGOs such as
the Al Shar’iyya Association invested vast sums in
setting up large medical establishments for the
treatment of cancer, kidney disease and so forth;
however, it simply could not keep up with the
ever-growing numbers. Similarly, in education,
they had lost their competitive edge for other
reasons, mainly because the provision of group
tutorials became redundant. By the beginning of
the decade (2000s) families preferred to send
their children to the tutorial classes taught by
school teachers at public schools in particular,
since school teachers had the upper hand in
passing or failing students (and they made no
secret of it when providing after-school tutorial
classes). The Islamist activists lost to a new cadre
of professional teachers in the provision of
tutorial classes at secondary level where parents
were struggling to have their children make it to
university. Organisations cut down on the group
tutorials they offered. In the study conducted in
2004 on 27 associations, there were only three
NGOs that were offering tutoring classes and two
NGOs that had literacy classes. In terms of hand-
outs, the role of Islamist welfare contributions
had also shrunk from being regularly provided all
year long to being reduced to special occasions
such as at Ramadan and the Feast of Al Adha,
and to emergency situations. Moreover, Islamist
outreach no longer involved a wide plethora of
interventions including youth-targeted cultural
and social activities. They were down to the bare
minimum of targeted hand-outs.
Moreover, in view of the increasing impoverishment
of the Egyptian population,6 Islamists needed
more resources to face shortcomings in social,
health and educational services. However, the
middle-class population also experienced
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deterioration in their social and economic status
and this greatly affected the revenues available
for responding to the growing deprivation. This
was compounded by the increased restrictions
laid on access to external funding.
The relatively relaxed political environment in
which Islamist groups were allowed to expand and
proliferate became increasingly restricted after the
launch of the international campaign against
terrorism following 9/11. The Egyptian government
sought to suppress the Islamist activists through
security and political and economic measures. The
state froze the Muslim Brotherhood’s economic
activities, and investigations indicated that the
financial cost of freezing 23 companies with 120
branches belonging to the Brotherhood amounted
to EGP1.5 billion.
Such blows to the funding resources of the Muslim
Brotherhood influenced its ability to support the
funding of hundreds of NGOs. The Brotherhood
was also faced with the task of funding the
campaign processes in the run up to the elections,
of 2005 and initial campaigning in 2010.7
Consequently, the Brotherhood redirected its funds
to more targeted one-off hand-outs during
Ramadan to potential voters in the phase prior to
the elections. In the Misr al Qadima (Old Cairo),
the electoral campaign coincided with Ramadan
and the Feast of Al Adha. Zakat money was
collected from the Muslim Brotherhood from
within the constituency and distributed to
nominated members or community development
associations (CDAs) in a show of solidarity of the
Brotherhood with the poor – and to remind them to
give them their votes (activists pers. comm. 2011).8
By the mid-2000s, the Muslim Brotherhood had
adopted a clear strategic direction in favour of
redirecting resources from a broad set of NGOs
to the local Muslim Brotherhood candidate
running for the 2005 elections. This direction was
partly to focus the funds and partly because the
NGOs which had provided them with a cover
were becoming ever more subject to security
harassment. For example, the Al Shar’iyya
Association, which was known to be a Salafi
organisation, had gradually become a refuge for
Muslim Brotherhood activists in the 1990s.
However, in order to block their increasing
takeover, the security apparatus empowered the
Salafis to rise against the Muslim Brotherhood
and ‘reclaim’ their organisation.
There are a number of other factors that led to
the waning of the Islamists’ lustre in welfare
outreach. The fact that they had a standard
menu of activities that were provided
irrespective of their local relevance made some
question the efficacy of their outreach. It was a
crisis of innovation in engaging with local
realities as much as it was a crisis of the absence
of new blood in these organisations, which had
ignored the possibilities that youth may have
something to contribute.
The exit of youth from the Muslim Brotherhood
also notably weakened the internal
organisational capacities of the movement, which
impacted on their affiliated welfare-providing
associations. A deep rift had already emerged
within the Muslim Brotherhood between the Old
Guard and the younger generations and which
weakened the internal organisational strength.
There has been a long-standing struggle between
those who were faithful to the politicised al da’wa
(prosletisation) role of the Muslim Brotherhood
and those that wished to separate the politics
from the da’wa and preferred to focus on building
the profile of the movement as a political
movement. The latter group which had a
significant youth backing wished to engage in
activism that went beyond the work based on
charitable work. Many youths within the
Brotherhood had become dissatisfied with the
existing leadership and how they engaged. This
led to the exit of many of the middle cadres of
the movement, particularly after the January
25th revolution. The exit of the middle rank
youth from the Brotherhood undoubtedly
weakened the welfare CSOs affiliated to the
movement.
4 Is there an Islamic alternative to the Islamist
welfare NGO?
A number of factors gave rise to the emergence
of an alternative to the Islamist-led charity
associations that also focused on working with
the socioeconomically marginalised. First, many
youths who wanted to become active in
community service did not want to be associated
with the Islamist political project out of fear that
they would be subject to security harassment
from the government. In other words, they did
not want to acquire ‘a security file’ with the
security investigations apparatus. The youth who
became volunteers in Islamist organisations
suddenly found themselves vulnerable to
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continuous security scrutiny, and hence chose a
number of ‘exit’ options: they left the
organisations altogether, they restricted their
level of involvement to the minimum, or they
transferred financial and in-kind support on an
occasional basis (such as during religious feasts,
etc.). The situation became particularly
uncomfortable for some youth volunteers when
the NGOs became transformed into the
platforms for winning candidates for the Islamist
nominees through the indiscriminate and wide
use of resources to bribe voters in the election.
Moreover, the Islamist organisations offered no
opportunities for the youth to assume leadership
positions within, because these NGOs were
under the authority and influence of traditional
leaders of the local elite. Youth were excluded
from decision-making processes, especially since
age was seen as a main criterion for eligibility to
assume senior positions.
The new generation of Islamic organisations that
were established during the 2000s spoke to the
need for religious-inspired community
engagement of the educated religious middle-
class youth. These youth wanted to engage in
charity to fulfil religious obligation and spiritual
needs in order to fulfil their obligations towards
the payment of zakat and to observe Islamic
ordinances of fulfilling the mission as a Muslim.
It allowed them to engage in direct activism
without being associated with political Islamic
groups. Moreover, it created spaces for providing
activities that were unconventional, diverse and
went beyond distributing food and goods. It
allowed the middle-class to use their resources
and to work in marginalised areas, which they
would not have had access to had they not had an
institutional umbrella for their work. Further,
because they worked in districts other than their
own, they did not act like local elites who were
using the extension of welfare to build a political
constituency.
Key examples of NGOs that embody this model
of middle-class religious-inspired youth activism
include: Resala, the Misr El Kheir Association,
Dar El Orman and Son’a Al Hayat. These are
briefly described below.
z Resala was established in 1999 by a group of
students in the faculty of engineering and
became formally established as an NGO in
2000. It has managed to attract large numbers
of young people through its religious-inspired
messages of giving and sharing. It now has
50 branches in all governorates and 100,000
volunteers, including a large number of
women. Activities include providing classes in
literacy, computer skills, language and support
for groups with special needs such as street
children, the elderly, the blind and those
suffering from a disability.
z The Misr El Kheir Association came into
being in 2007, with the aim of directing zakat
money for community development, evident in
its motto of ‘Developing Human Being is our
Task’. The fact that the association is chaired
by the Grand Mufti of Egypt has paved the
way for receiving financial support both from
the government and businessmen. The
association has expanded quickly and works
nationwide in extending charity income
generation but also in undertaking large-scale
initiatives such as supporting the heart centre
in Aswan with catheterisation equipment.
z Dar El Orman was established as a charity
association in 1996 under the sponsorship of
the Al Qabai family. In its mission, it focuses
on ‘doing good’ and ‘helping the needy’, as
part of the human religious duty. The
association has 13 branches, including in the
governorates of: Giza, Minia, El Bahiera, El
Sharkia, El Fayoum, Assuit, Qana, Aswan,
Beni Suef, Sohag, Kafr El Shiekh and Gharbia.
While it uses religious discourse, its volunteers
cross political and ideological lines. Dar El
Orman became popular for its work on
promoting sustainable rural livelihoods but
has expanded to include highly unconventional
initiatives such as a project to use stem cells in
treating diabetes and supporting research to
use nanotechnology in treating cancer.
z Son’a Al Hayat was established by the
supporters of the Islamic preacher Amr
Khaled, who has a television programme of
the same name. Inspired by his interviews on
it, the idea of organising initiatives to serve
the community was formed. This NGO is the
voice of the educated middle-class youth who
are the main audience of Amr Khaled. The
activists and members are committed
ideologically and denominationally to the
spirit of what has been called ‘moderate
Islam’; an umbrella term for those belonging
to Islamic groups including the Muslim
Brotherhood.
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A review of the different projects implemented
by this new generation of religious-inspired
associations suggests that they are large-scale
organisations that operate on a nationwide level
via local branches: but decision-making remains
centralised. It is important to note that all these
new generation organisations have been initiated
with a ‘godfather’ figure behind them. These
figures are from what can be called the moderate
Islamic wave. They have high-profile
personalities but do not get involved directly in
the daily running of these NGOs.
The distinctive factor in these organisations
compared with their Islamist counterparts, is in
their ability to recruit volunteers in large
numbers and with a very high level of youth
involvement. Volunteers may engage in all kinds
of activities, ranging from driving the sick;
visiting an elder; reading or recording a book for
the blind; being a brother to an orphanage. It
should be taken into consideration that Islamist
NGOs have had a much smaller pool of
volunteers than the newer types of NGOs. In
Resala for example, there are 10,000 volunteers,
a number that well exceeds the taskforce of those
who belong to the Muslim Brotherhood. In the
previously mentioned study conducted on 27 local
religious NGOs, it was found that only 14.8 per
cent of the total sample depended on
volunteering, while the rest relied on paid work
or secondment from the Ministry of Social
Affairs. The activities of these NGOs absorbed
thousands of youths who do not live in poor
neighbourhoods and were willing to volunteer
without any ideological or security pressures. The
fact that they work in other areas also prevented
the development of patron–client relations or the
mobilisation of the beneficiaries for supporting a
particular political candidate. The activities do
not seem to be directly intended to support the
political agenda of any one party or movement.
For example, there seems to be no
instrumentalisation of assistance for directing
beneficiaries to vote in any particular way. It is
also evident in their support for constituents such
as street children and the disabled, who do not
have an electoral voice. This is in sharp contrast
to the Islamist organisations that often focus
many of their activities among the sections of the
population that have voter power.
However, the organisations do rely on religious
idiom and rhetoric, which are already very
pervasive in Egyptian culture, to inspire youth to
volunteer and to mobilise resources. It is also clear
in slogans that sum up the essence of their mission,
such as ‘Your gateway to do good’, ‘Together we
make life’, ‘The enjoyment of giving’ and ‘Our
mission is to develop human beings’. Their
activities represent the standard staple of
religious-inspired charity, such as the distribution
of food bags during Ramadan and meat for the El
Adha Feast, and sponsorship of orphans. While
some political Islamic groups use the same
methods of traditional religious associations
controlled by it, Islamic NGOs think that working
in its associations is a political and religious duty.
It also subjected such works to the prescriptions of
political leadership and their definition of
appropriate behaviour (such as wearing the veil
for women, which then evolved into wearing the
niqab and long white robe for men; no smoking;
participation in regular group prayer in the
mosque; boycotting all forms of artistic practices;
prohibiting gender mixing). Such prescriptions
clashed with the youth who had no intention of
abandoning a ‘modern way of living’ in order to
comply with the political leadership of these
organisations. This difference contributed to the
increase in the base of active volunteers in the new
generation NGOs because they felt more at liberty.
Unlike the large politically oriented Islamist
organisations which often keep their budgets
clandestine, this newer generation of religious
associations publicise their budgets widely in the
press and media. They also follow a modern
auditing system, which enjoys a high level of
transparency and is subject to control and
inspection. This is particularly appealing to
middle-class and wealthy businessmen who wish to
make charitable contributions in a transparent
way, so that they do not become entangled in
inadvertently contributing to the political activities
of religious groups – and which would create
conflict with the government. Not surprisingly,
they have been able to mobilise large amounts of
funding from sources that do not necessarily
espouse the Islamist agenda and who feel more
comfortable in supporting non-political activity.
While these organisations work within an overall
religious framework, the absence of the
endorsement of a particular political ideological
movement has allowed it a certain level of
flexibility in observance of religious prescripts.
This has been particularly appealing for the
Siam The Islamist vs the Islamic in Welfare Outreach 92
upper and middle-class volunteers and supporters
who do not have to conform to specific ways of
engaging. For example, there is no gender
segregation among the youth volunteers in the
implementation of the activities, a characteristic
of the work approach in the Islamist counterparts.
However, despite the fact that a large number of
girls and women have joined these organisations,
they still continue to be dominated by men,
particularly in leadership and decision-making
processes. This is also partly because they
continue to rely on Islamic religious cultural
precepts in mobilising resources. Support and
activities provided by these CDAs are not
accompanied by any political propaganda or
requests that impose on beneficiaries a
commitment to an Islamic uniform or going to
the mosque or having a beard. Accordingly, the
activists in these associations have less
conditional ties to volunteering.
Furthermore, what characterises this new
generation of religious-inspired NGOs is that, in
addition to extending charity and relief, they
have also ventured into new territories in
research, education, income generation and
community development, which are a
considerable shift from the staple menu
approach of many of the Islamist organisations.
5 Conclusion
The general trend of the newer generation of
Islamic NGOs continues to rise and the
increasing demise of the Islamist NGOs is likely
to continue. The fact that political Islamist
forces now have the right to establish their own
parties may mean that they will invest less in
indirect pathways of political engagement
through NGOs. How politicised religious-
inspired associational support will become in the
future is unknown. It is important to note
however, that while it is impossible to argue that
the volunteers are not political activists, it is safe
to say that they distinguish between their
political activity and their volunteer work. This
corps of middle-class youth volunteers was the
initiator of January 25th revolution in their
personal capacities (not under the institutional
umbrella of their organisation). Yet, following
the ousting of President Mubarak, many of these
volunteers were present in Tahrir Square
wearing the T-shirts and badges of their 17
NGOs, such as Resala volunteers, who launched
a campaign to clean up the square.
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Notes
1 To give a sense of the scope of resources that
can be generated under the religious rubric:
the 6,000 committees established for the
collection of zakat, set up by the Nasser Social
Bank, collected EGP2 billion during the fiscal
year 2010/11. These committees are
distributed throughout a large number of
mosques that are affiliated to Islamist NGOs
(www.alorsanews.com, the site of El Borsa
newspaper, 20 August 2011). The zakat
committees constitute a limited proportion of
zakat and charity collection in Egypt.
Moreover, money is collected directly from
mosque goers. There may be 10,800 mosques
independent of the Ministry of Waqf, except
for 55,000 mosques (statement of El Waqf,
undersecretary of El Tahrir newspaper,
20 August 2011).
2 www.ikhwanonline.com (accessed 9 December
2011).
3 http://forum.egypt.com (accessed 9 December
2011).
4 www.ikhwanonline.com (accessed 21 August
2011).
5 http://ikhwanismailia.com (accessed 23 May
2011).
6 The Chairman of the Central Agency for
Public Mobilization and Statistics in Egypt
mentioned that a study conducted in
September 2010 in 4,040 villages affirmed that
in the poorest 100 villages in Egypt, 76 per cent
of the population live below the poverty line.
7 Until it withdrew from the elections due to
wide-scale voter rigging.
8 Interview with activists in the Muslim
Brotherhood in a dialogue with the researcher
during the electoral campaign.
Reference
Shobieb, A. (1994) Terrorism Funders, Cairo: El
Helal Publishing House: 95
